

72 Medal, 1976

Archival Medicine

BORIS T. PASH

BOX NO. 3  
ACCESSION NO. 7203-2/19



3-5 Bons Pash

Subject File

by

Espionage

Kayl / 1947 2090am



20 January 1947

MEMO FOR THE FILES

SUBJECT: Dr. Kayl - German Espionage Agent.

1. Information received by Mr. Skinner from the European Theater indicates that one Dr. Kayl is of record there as having been in the United States as a German espionage agent from 1941 to 1943; that his mission was to procure information on Army matters, ~~and~~ particularly "technical and atomic research".

2. The same message indicates that an individual named Kaul is of record with the American Headquarters in Europe and bears the following identity and record:

Was a member of KPD from 1927 to 1933.  
Jewish

Imprisoned at Dachau until 1937.

Proceeded to the United States via Costa Rica, allegedly through efforts of the Gestapo.

Repatriated to Germany October 1945.

Released June 1946 from internment in the U. S. Zone and to be proceeding to the Soviet Zone of Berlin to join his wife.

Description: 5 feet, 7 inches; dark brown eyes; dark blond hair; scar on left cheek.

3. It is apparent that the originators of the message have no way of determining if the individual named Kaul who went to Berlin last June is identical with the man named Kayl described in paragraph 1.

4. I don't recall any case of a German spy by this name having been picked up in the United States or having been mentioned in any of our reports as having been engaged in espionage. I shall check with Major Rhodes' Section and see if any confirmation of the above information can be obtained through him or the FBI.

5. In the event confirmation is obtained, it is well to bear in mind that subject may be utilized in the future by the Russians for the same or a similar purpose against the United States.

JOHNSON

*Checked w/ Skinner -  
He does not go to  
FBI on these matters just  
now - He will forward anything  
new on this - JH*

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

Authority NOV 756112

By 9/2 NARS, Date 24 FEB 1976

CARDED

3-5 Bonn Pash

Subject file

Espionage

Kayl / 1947  
209000



~~SECRET~~

Frankfurt a/M, Germany  
23 October 1945

INFORMATION OBTAINED BY THE GERMAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE  
RELATIVE TO ALLIED ATOMIC RESEARCH

Interrogation of many individuals in the Abwehr, RSHA, Speer's Ministry, and the Reichsforschungsrat leads to the conclusion that the German Intelligence Service obtained very little worthwhile information concerning Allied atomic research.

The investigation on this matter has been conducted in the following areas:

| <u>Organization</u>         | <u>Interest of the Organization<br/>in Atomic Research</u>                                    | <u>Person Interrogated</u>                    |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|
| 1. Abwehr                   | Charged with the collection of information through the use of Agents.                         | Thomas Huebner<br>Walter Stockmann            |
| 2. RSHA<br>Amt. VI W1/T     | Charged with the collection of information of a technical nature concerning foreign research. | Hans Ogilvie                                  |
| 3. RSHA<br>Amt. III C1      | Charged with the collection of information concerning foreign science and learning.           | Helmut Fischer<br>George Ertl                 |
| 4. Reichsforschung-<br>srat | Charged with the responsibility for German research in atomic physics.                        | Abraham Esau<br>Henry Albers<br>Harald Muller |
| 5. Speer's Ministry         | Charged with the responsibility for war production.                                           | Geist                                         |

It is the considered opinion of the investigating officer that any information obtained by the German Intelligence Service would have been obtained as a result of requests from the above listed groups and would have later been submitted to these groups for proper evaluation.

- 1 -

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

Authority NWD 750112

By CD/S.R. NARS, Date 24 FEB 1976

3-5 Bonn Pash

Subject file

Espionage

Karl / 1947  
209000



~~SECRET~~

ABWEHR - Interrogation of Korvettan Kapitan Thomas Huebner, Eins Marine, Paris; and Oberst Leutnant Walter Stockmann, assistant, revealed that in May 1942 a serious attempt was made to determine Allied progress in atomic physics. On this date Henry Albers, an organic chemist from Danzig, came to Paris bringing with him a list of questions prepared by Abraham Esau, Director of the Physics Section of the Reichsforschungsrat, regarding American experiments on atomic physics. The questions were as follows:

1. Where is the production place of "heavy water" in America?
2. What is the connection between helium experiments and atomic research?
3. Are there large quantities of "heavy paraffine" being produced in America and is it being used in the atomic experimentation?
4. Is the General Electric Company performing work in its laboratories on atomic physics?
5. Where is Professor DeBye working in America?
6. Is the high voltage experimental station near the Canadian border connected with atomic research?
7. Can the uranium isotope 235 be separated through the introduction of light and whether or not this method was being tried in America?

After delivering these questions to Huebner, Albers delivered a brief lecture to Huebner and a civilian outlining the basic facts concerning atomic physics. The civilian was Alfred Meiler alias Kohler, who was then sent as an intelligence agent to New York City. Huebner stated that he frequently communicated through Radio Hamburg with Kohler but never received any definite information. Later on two individuals named Kusters and Lech were briefed by Walter Stockmann, Huebner's assistant, to take some diamonds to Kohler in New York since he was running out of money. Communication with Kohler was ended in March 1945.

Further interrogation of Albers revealed that, acting as the liaison between

~~SECRET~~ - 2 -

Subject file

Espionage

Kohl / 1947  
209000



~~SECRET~~

the Reichsforschungsrat and the various intelligence offices, he received at least three reports concerning Allied atomic research. (It is the opinion of the investigating officer that Reports #1 and #2 originated from Kohler.) The reports were described by Albers as follows:

Report #1 - Code name of German agent at the top of the page. About three pages in length, dated about the first part of 1943. Contents: 1. The location of DeBye's working place was given. (Albers thinks it was in some New York City laboratory.) 2. A statement that a large amount of "heavy water" was being produced in Schnectady. 3. That there was a large production of uranium in Canada. 4. That a powder was being produced, a compound of which contained "heavy water", and that the strength of this powder was 500 to 1,000 times greater than usual. In the opinion of Albers, it was supposed to be the report answering the original questions propounded by Esau. All information contained in the report was stupid and could be found in books. The scientists laughed over the report for its childishness and felt that some person had been reading sensational newspapers.

Report #2 - Same code name at the top, dated about two months later. Contents: 1. That an attempt was being made to separate the isotopes of uranium through the introduction of light and that it was being done on a large scale. 2. That "heavy water" was being produced. 3. Something about Schenectady which Albers had forgotten. This report was as stupid as the first and contained no information of any value.

Report #3 - Different code name. Written about the end of 1943 or the beginning of 1944. About one sheet in length. Contents: This report dealt exclusively with heavy paraffine. It named a laboratory in which heavy paraffine was used. The name of the laboratory Albers has forgotten but he did remember that he was very much surprised that it was an electrical plant and not some

~~SECRET~~

3-5 Bon's Pash

Subject File

Espionage

Kayl / 1947 2092



~~SECRET~~

chemical concern where one might expect the use of this material. This report was more intelligent than the preceding two.

Huebner reiterated, and his remarks were independently corroborated by Stockmann, his assistant, that to his knowledge very little had been learned by his group concerning Allied atomic experiments.

RSHA - Amt. VI Wl/T

This referat of the RSHA was organized in April 1944 under the direction of Dr. Hans Ogilvie. Upon interrogation, Ogilvie stated that although no person or group pushed him for information on Allied atomic experimentation, it was nevertheless one of the missions of his referat and he accordingly made efforts to learn something about this experimentation. His group attempted to secure all possible American magazines containing scientific information. Generally the magazines were brought in from Portugal, Spain, Sweden or Switzerland. Life, Radio Handbook, Physics Review, Ship Building Record, Naval Architect, and Time were some of the magazines utilized. Seldom were the files complete. According to Ogilvie, no information of importance was gained from this source. Ogilvie's group attempted to gain information by giving orders to the military, political and commercial amts of the RSHA to find out about all scientific research and experimentation. Radio monitoring was also utilized. In October 1944 Gimpel and two others were sent by U-boat to America to find out about technical matters. These men were dispatched by the political abteilung, Amt VI, and Ogilvie was given the job of briefing Gimpel. For one hour and a half Ogilvie talked to Gimpel, instructing him on technical matters. No names or installations were given to Gimpel since, according to Ogilvie, his group had no contacts in America. In the event that Gimpel received any information on atoms he was to communicate it by radio to Ogilvie who would then issue specific instructions. Ogilvie stated that he did not attempt to stuff Gimpel with information on atoms since Gimpel

~~SECRET~~

Don't rush  
Subject file  
Espionage  
Karl / 1947  
209200



~~SECRET~~

was not a technician and the material would simply confuse him. In November Gimpel was captured and Ogilvie never received any report on his activities. According to Ogilvie, the folder in the files of Ref. W1/T on "Atoms" consisted of about twenty typewritten pages containing, to the best of Ogilvie's memory, the following:

1. Nils Bohr - Where is he? Does the office in Copenhagen know about Bohr? Is it possible to establish connections with Bohr? Bohr's reception by Churchill? Bohr's supposed visit to Moscow? 2. Report of a visit which Fischer (physics specialist of the group) made to Gerlach (chief, Reichsforschungsrat) in which they discussed the atom theory. 3. A request dated February 1945 from Gerlach for information about the atom bomb. (Ogilvie does not remember the question but states that nothing was ever done about the request since the group left Berlin the next month.

Ogilvie stated that in June 1944 he attended a conference in Berlin with Menzel Schumann, Skorzeny, and Schellenberg. The primary discussion concerned a "Hohlraumladung" or new type of shell which utilized a loose packing system supposedly to produce a terrific blast. At this time the question came up as to whether through this explosion an atomic breakdown could be partially achieved. The German, according to Ogilvie, did not believe that they could have a complete atomic reaction but only a partial breakdown. At the conference mention was made of the fact that they knew nothing about American experiments. Ogilvie himself stated at this conference that his group had not been able to penetrate the Russian or American security in regard to atom experimentation. In March 1945 Ogilvie told this to Schellenberg in Berlin and Schellenberg acknowledged that it was difficult to gain information especially in this technical field where the agent had to be a technician as well. Ogilvie stated that he personally felt that America was going strong in atom experimentation because of the picture of the

~~SECRET~~

Subject file  
Espionage  
Karl / 1947  
2092



~~SECRET~~

concentration of electrical energy. However, he reiterated that no specific information ever passed through his hands concerning Allied experimentation.

RSA, Amt III, CI:

Organizationally, Amt III CI (Science and Learning) was charged with the collection of information relative to foreign science and learning. Accordingly, Dr. Helmut Fischer and George Michael Ertol were interrogated. The name for this section was apparently a misnomer since, although foreign magazines and scientific publications were scanned, in reality the section concerned itself more with internal problems. Both Ertol and Fischer stated that nothing of significance was learned in this group relative to Allied atomic experiments.

REICHSFORSCHUNGSRAT:

Since the Reichsforschungsrat, first under Professor Abraham Esau as Director of Physics and later under Walter Gerlach, was charged with the problem of research in atomic physics, it is logical to assume that any information concerning Allied progress would eventually be transmitted to this group for their use and evaluation. Accordingly Professor Abraham Esau was interrogated and he emphatically declared that his department was completely ignorant of the progress which the Allies were making. The names of such men as Chadwick, Oliphant and Bohr were well known and their experiments up to the outbreak of war were public knowledge. Esau stated that he was aware of the potential ability of the Allies to engage in atomic research and he presumed that the Allies were doing such work. However, never was any specific information reflecting the status of Allied experiments transmitted to his bureau. Since his department was charged with this research, Esau stated that in his opinion any information learned by any agency would ultimately have been passed to him. Esau added that in his opinion Walter Gerlach, his successor, received no information on Allied experiments. Although Esau no longer directed the Physics Department after 1943, he remained in close touch with Gerlach and would have been informed of any information of this type. Harald Muller, assistant to Esau, stated that never did he hear any specific information regarding Allied

Subject File  
Espionage  
Kauf / 1947  
209000



~~SECRET~~

atomic experiments. He further commented that Professor Esau was extremely surprised when the atom bomb was publicised. Henry Albers, previously mentioned in the discussion of Abwehr activities, although never officially an employee of the Reichsforschungsrat, was given a specific job in connection with German atomic experimentation and as has been previously stated, acted as the liaison for Esau and Gerlach with the various intelligence offices. Albers was of the opinion that no information other than the reports previously mentioned, was received by the Reichsforschungsrat on Allied atomic experimentation since in 1944 he talked to Professor Gerlach in Berlin and Gerlach told him that he had learned nothing of use. Gerlach later wrote a short memorandum to Albers confirming this statement.

SPEER'S MINISTRY:

Since the Speer's Ministry was charged with the responsibility of war production and for development, it was deemed advisable to interrogate Oberst Leutnant Frederick Geist, head of Amt group Entwicklung (development) and accordingly the following question was put: "In your capacity with the Speer Ministry, what information was transmitted to you relative to Allied atomic experiments?" Geist stated that to his knowledge no information of any kind relative to Allied atomic experimentation passed thru the channels of the Speer's Ministry.

Many of the persons interrogated stated that in their opinion German attempts to achieve scientific organization were haphazard and ill-conceived and also that there was no aggressive, efficient, coordinated attempt to secure information regarding Allied atomic experimentation. It is the opinion of the investigating officer that these comments are justified and that no information of significance was obtained by the German Intelligence Service regarding Allied atomic experimentation.

~~SECRET~~

*David S. Teeple*  
DAVID S. TEEPLE  
Captain, MI

*L*



~~SECRET~~

SPECIAL INTERROVATIONS OF SCHELLENBERG, 15 and 21 September

1. KNOWLEDGE OF ATOMIC EXPERIMENTS AND TECHNICAL ACHIEVEMENTS OF USA.

SCHELLENBERG can recall discussing atomic experiments only with SPENGLER of Amt III (an ex-Catholic theologian who was particularly interested in scientific matters) in a general conversation in the winter of 1943-44. SCHELLENBERG says he understood little of the matter himself. SPENGLER spoke especially of the work of HEYSENBERG of Berlin in this field.

SCHELLENBERG tried to stir up interest in procuring information on foreign work in the field, but got no co-operation from OKW. About August, 1944 OGILVIE of VI W1/T was put in charge of the whole matter. OGILVIE then instituted some training for investigation into the matter. An aviation technician (name unknown) was trained in Berlin under Amt VI for two or three months and sent to Switzerland, with the cover of commercial attache or something similar at the Legation in Bern. This man was supposed to study the U.S. armament industry, especially rocket production, and SCHELLENBERG assumes that atomic experiments were included in his assignment. SCHELLENBERG never saw any reports by him, and doubts that he ever prepared any of any importance, since OGILVIE would have passed them to SCHELLENBERG if he had.

Another aviation technician was supposed to collect similar technical information in Spain. He was to go there about the same time as the technician mentioned above was to go to Bern. It is not clear whether this man got to Spain. As far as SCHELLENBERG knows, no reports came from him. SCHELLENBERG states that there was considerable impatience at home because of the lack of results.

SCHELLENBERG recalls a second discussion with OGILVIE on his last visit to Berlin, in March 1943, when he was about to visit Sweden. SCHELLENBERG discussed technical matters (including atomic experiments?) with KLEYENSTUEBER, Oberst WAGNER, and perhaps OHLETZ.

Only the two technicians, in Switzerland and Spain, were assigned to this particular problem.

OGILVIE's section produced nothing of any significance on American technical developments, except studies based on technical journals, including one on gas, issued at the end of 1944, which SCHELLENBERG passed to the OKW. This was the last such report from VI W1/T that SCHELLENBERG recalls seeing.

SCHELLENBERG added that material captured in the East supplied the Germans with knowledge of Allied technical progress in 1944, when practically nothing could be learned by intelligence methods. He knows nothing of any important hauls of this kind as a result of the Ardennes offensive; in any case, OKW and not Amt VI would have been informed of this.

~~SECRET~~

THIS PAGE  
DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

Authority NND 750112

By CD/52 NARS, Date 24 FEB 1976

Subject file  
Espionage  
Kauf / 1947  
2090



( ~~SECRET~~ )

8. AMT VI EXPERTS ON AMERICA

SCHELLENBERG mentions PAEFFGEN, SCHUEDDEKOPF, Hstuf PRAETSCH, and GROSS as being the chief experts on America. Of ZSCHUNKE, he says that he dealt only with Belgium and Holland, and had nothing to do with America. PFANNSTIEL he does not recall.

Colin ROSS never worked in Amt VI, but with Dr. NAEGERLE of the Auswaertiges Amt, who dealt with propaganda against ROOSEVELT's re-election. In the Spring of 1942 (1943?) RIBBENTROP asked SCHELLENBERG to get reports from America to show how NAEGERLE's propaganda was faring; in fact, to set up a political intelligence post in America.

Hstuf MAYWALD worked on the U.S. in Amt VI, and was sent to Spain at the beginning of 1943, with the aim of working with SCHMIDT (or SCHMITZ,) an art-dealer, and Mme. de POMPO, in Madrid. The three set up a fashion shop. Their aim was to exploit very good connections, social, political, and military, in Spanish society, to get reports on the U.S. SCHMIDT had run an art gallery in Paris, and had a reputation as an art expert. He had been picked up by the German police in Dusseldorf for swindling, or something of the sort, and after this was taken over by Amt VI. The fashion shop went bankrupt, as a result of SCHMIDT's manipulations, but Amt VI set it up again in business. The reports received from this trio were not good.

MAYWALD had never been in the U.S. He was a former Army officer, had a British wife, and spoke English well.

Hstuf MOHR had never been, according to SCHELLENBERG in Amt VI. In 1942 he was a specialist on the U.S. in VI D, after working in V.I. C. He was sent in 1943 to Istanbul to cover American information there. There he got mixed up in the RENO complex, an intelligence organization operating in the Near East, with the German journalist REICHERT and an Italian SAMPONI. SCHELLENBERG was suspicious of the RENO complex, which he thought produced results too quickly, but it was relied on by others. MOHR and a Frau CROUS were supposed to check up on it. They were also supposed to get reports on America, but were unsuccessful. As far as SCHELLENBERG knows, they are both still in Turkey. MOHR was widely travelled, but SCHELLENBERG does not know whether he had ever been to America.

SCHELLENBERG does not recall Ostuf RUDOLPH, CARSTEN's successor. BURMANN, he thinks, only did evaluations. He does not remember HAMANN or DENKER, who he says must have worked under PARFFGEN.

Among part-time collaborators of VI D on America, he mentions PFEFFER of the Auslandswissenschaftliche Fakultät in Berlin, and the Chairman of the Industrieverband, and some other industrialists (names unknown) who had been in the U.S. The sort of work that was produced included studies on specific problems like the Negro question - a good report, though it had, SCHELLENBERG remarks, nothing to do with intelligence. In general, Amt VI tried to make use of people who had been in America but SCHELLENBERG thinks no outstanding results were achieved.

SECRET

THIS PAGE  
DECLASSIFIED -

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Authority NND 750112  
By CD/SP NARS, Date 24 FEB 1976

3-5 Bonn Pash  
Subject file  
Espionage  
Karl / 1947  
2090



~~SECRET~~

coverage of the American press was (that of the British, he says was thorough). Reports on technical matters from the press were handled by the technical section, not by VI D.

DAUFELDT had had the habit of turning out reports on specialized problems (e.g. steel production) which he claimed were supplemented and confirmed by Intelligence sources, but which were nothing but summaries of press reports.

A considerable volume of Portuguese diplomatic reports dealing with the U.S. were procured through contacts of KO Leiter KRAEMER @ von KASTROP with the Portuguese, and this source continued until the end of the war.

10. KNOWLEDGE OF U.S. AND OTHER CODES.

SCHELLENBERG insists that the only American code that he knows was broken was that between Bern and Washington, which was regularly intercepted and decoded from 1943 until the end. \* He adds that a certain amount of tactical messages were no doubt decoded at the front, but claims to know nothing about them. The OKW did the deciphering of the Bern-Washington traffic; THIELE of OKW worked closely with SCHELLENBERG. The Bern-Washington traffic was given to VI D, and used there in making up summary reports. If there was indication that German sources had supplied some of the information, this was passed on to the VI Z for handling; SCHELLENBERG thinks that VI Z never caught anyone as a result of this. SCHELLENBERG decided whether any of this traffic was to go to Amt IV.

The Forschungsamt deciphering was far less effective than that of OKW. SCHELLENBERG is sure that Amt IV could not have carried on deciphering without his knowledge (because of SCHELLENBERG's close connection with THIELE).

SELCHOW was in charge of deciphering for the Auswaertiges Amt. Again, SCHELLENBERG thinks he would have learned of anything important there through THIELE or KETTELER.

On the other hand, Turkish traffic between Washington and Ankara was regularly broken from April 1943 and was most interesting, supplying information of some political significance. To specific questions, SCHELLENBERG replied that Vatican traffic, Irish, Persian and Scandinavian were not broken; the only additional important traffic that was decoded was Polish.

The Turkish traffic dealt with Russo-American, American-Turkish, and Russo-Turkish relations; the fourth term; Big Three meetings; instructions to delegates in Turkey.

\*N.B. This disagrees with WIRSING's statement that the W/T intercept submissions included coverage of reports from HARRIMAN in Moscow on Poland; CAFFERY in Paris on DeGAULLE; and the US representative in Bulgaria.

~~SECRET~~

THIS PAGE  
DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) -

Authority NND 740120

By CD/SZ NARS, Date 24 FEB 1976



COPY  
from  
THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES  
Record Group No. 77

MEID

68.95 U.S.  
German Int. in  
U.S. general

10. KNOWLEDGE OF U.S. AND OTHER CODES.

A considerable volume of German code books was known to the U.S. and was passed through channels of the War Relocation Authority to the U.S. and this source continued until the end of the war.

SECRETARY OF STATE insists that the only American code book that he knows was broken was that between the U.S. and Germany, which was broken in 1943. He adds that a certain amount of tactical messages were no longer decoded at the front, but claims to know nothing about them. The G.W. did the deciphering of the German-Washington traffic; the G.W. worked closely with SCHLESINGER. The German-Washington traffic was given to VI D. and used there in making up summary reports. It was indicated that German sources had supplied some of the information. This was passed on to the VI D. for handling; SCHLESINGER thinks that VI D. never caught anyone as a result of this. SCHLESINGER decided whether any of this traffic was to go to Amt IV.

The Foreigners' Department deciphering was far less effective than that of OKW. SCHLESINGER is sure that Amt IV could not have carried on deciphering without his knowledge (because of SCHLESINGER's close connection with them).

SCHLESINGER was in charge of deciphering for the Auswärtiges Amt. Again, SCHLESINGER thinks he would have learned of anything important that came through them or otherwise.

On the other hand, Turkish traffic between Washington and Ankara was broken from April 1943 and was most interesting, especially information of some political significance. To specific questions, SCHLESINGER replied that German traffic, Irish, Persian and Spanish were not broken; the only additional important traffic that was broken was Polish.

The Turkish traffic dealt with Axis-American, American-Turkish and German-Turkish relations; the latter part of the traffic was passed on to the Turkish government in Ankara.

U.S. This discussion with WISTING's statement that the W.T. Laboratory's discussion included coverage of reports from HARRMAN in Moscow on Poland; GATSBY in Paris on DeGaulle; and the US representative in Belgium.

THIS PAGE  
DECLASSIFIED  
ON 11/11/01 BY 30120  
DATE 11/11/01

SECRET